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    Carmelics

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    Sonja Smets — Carmelics
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    Sonja Smets

    contemporaryDynamic Epistemic Logic / Formal Epistemology

    Sonja Smets is a contemporary logician and formal epistemologist at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) at the University of Amsterdam. She is known for her work in dynamic epistemic logic, belief revision, and logical foundations of quantum computation. Her research bridges formal logic, epistemic game theory, and the semantics of rational belief update.

    Notable Achievements

    1

    Developed logical frameworks for belief revision and plausibility update operators

    2

    Contributed to the logical foundations of quantum information and quantum computation

    3

    Advanced dynamic epistemic logic approaches to epistemic game theory

    4

    Analyzed the Aumann–Stalnaker debate on common knowledge and backward induction using formal models

    5

    Co-developed dynamic-doxastic logics for iterated belief change

    Positions & Arguments(2)

    Skepticism

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    Truth & Knowledge

    claim

    At a Glance

    Ideas

    2

    Topics

    2

    Era

    contemporary

    Tradition

    Dynamic Epistemic Logic / Formal Epistemology

    Topic Influence

    Truth & Knowledge2
    Skepticism2

    Related Thinkers

    David Lewis2 shared

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    Immanuel Kant
    2 shared
    Boyd2 shared
    Brian Skyrms2 shared
    Stathis Psillos2 shared
    Bertrand Russell2 shared
    David Hume2 shared
    Aristotle2 shared

    Dive Deeper

    Explore Truth & Knowledge→See Skepticism→