b. 1967
Theodore Sider is an American analytic philosopher known for his influential work in metaphysics, particularly on topics such as four-dimensionalism, temporal parts, ontological realism, and the philosophy of modality. He has made major contributions to debates about persistence, composition, and the structure of reality, arguing that metaphysical questions have objective answers grounded in the fundamental 'joint-carving' structure of the world.
Developed a rigorous defense of four-dimensionalism and temporal parts in 'Four-Dimensionalism' (2001)
Introduced the concept of 'structure' as joint-carving naturalness in 'Writing the Book of the World' (2011)
Advanced influential arguments on unrestricted composition and the ontology of material objects
Made significant contributions to modal realism and the metaphysics of modality
Co-authored the widely used textbook 'Riddles of Existence' on core metaphysical problems
Both the existence monist and existence nihilist must establish that the premises of the exclusion argument (or any alternative they provide) have sufficient plausibility to override considerations from intuition and perception.
claimThere is no viable conception of vector properties on which vector properties are both necessarily extrinsic and capable of being fundamental
claimThe truth of a proposition in a world does not entail that the proposition exists in that world
claimOrdinary objects include both actually concrete objects and possible objects that are not in fact concrete but could have been.
claimThe apparent multiplication of word-tokens from a single inscription based on different readings is not a genuine mereological multiplication of entities
Both the existence monist and existence nihilist must establish that the premises of the exclusion argument (or any alternative they provide) have sufficient plausibility to override considerations from intuition and perception.
claimThe lack of informativeness is not a good objection to the optimalist account of negative truths
claimThe truth of a proposition in a world does not entail that the proposition exists in that world