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    A brain-in-a-vat would not have satisfied the causal cons... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Warfield's use of premise 1 ('I think that water is wet') begs the question against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis

    A brain-in-a-vat would not have satisfied the causal constraints on having the concept water

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    From a Putnamian point of view, one could not have warrant for the belief 'I thi...Given content externalism, Warfield cannot have a priori knowledge of premise 1 ...Therefore, warrant for premise 1 requires prior warrant to believe that one is n...Warfield's use of premise 1 ('I think that water is wet') begs the question agai...

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    Given content externalism, then, Warfield cannot have the desired a priori knowledge of premise 1 (“I think that water is wet”). Does this mean that his use of premise 1 begs the question? Apparently so. Certainly, from a Putnamian point of view, the question is begged. For on that point of view, one could not have warrant for premise 1 unless one had warrant to believe that (unlike a BIV) one had satisfied the causal constraints on having the concept water. Thus it would seem that—absent any a

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