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    Warfield's use of premise 1 ('I think that water is wet')... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
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    Warfield's use of premise 1 ('I think that water is wet') begs the question against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis

    Philosophy of LanguageSkepticism
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.On Burge's social externalism, the content of 'I think water is wet' is fixed by communal usage, which a BIV ex hypothesi lacks access to.
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    • 2.Warfield's premise 1 presupposes successful reference to water, but successful reference requires causal-historical grounding a BIV cannot possess.
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    • 3.Thus premise 1 smuggles in the very environmental embeddedness that the BIV hypothesis denies, making the anti-skeptical argument circular.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.McKinsey's paradox shows that combining privileged first-person access with content externalism entails a priori knowledge of contingent environmental facts.
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    • 2.If Warfield's premise 1 is knowable a priori yet its truth requires non-BIV causal history, then its assertion already assumes one inhabits the relevant environment.
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    • 3.An argument whose first premise can only be warrantedly asserted by a non-BIV cannot non-question-beggingly establish that one is not a BIV.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Given content externalism, Warfield cannot have a priori knowledge of premise 1 ('I think that water is wet')
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    • 2.From a Putnamian point of view, one could not have warrant for the belief 'I think that water is wet' unless one had warrant to believe that one had satisfied the causal constraints on having the concept water
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    • 3.A brain-in-a-vat would not have satisfied the causal constraints on having the concept water
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    Topics

    SkepticismPhilosophy of Language

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    Related

    A brain-in-a-vat would not have satisfied the causal constraints on having the c...An argument whose first premise can only be warrantedly asserted by a non-BIV ca...From a Putnamian point of view, one could not have warrant for the belief 'I thi...Given content externalism, Warfield cannot have a priori knowledge of premise 1 ...
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    If Warfield's premise 1 is knowable a priori yet its truth requires non-BIV caus...McKinsey's paradox shows that combining privileged first-person access with cont...On Burge's social externalism, the content of 'I think water is wet' is fixed by...Therefore, warrant for premise 1 requires prior warrant to believe that one is n...Thus premise 1 smuggles in the very environmental embeddedness that the BIV hypo...Warfield's premise 1 presupposes successful reference to water, but successful r...

    Similar

    The use of premise (A*) begs the question against the brain-in-a-vat h...87%A priori knowledge of the proposition that one is thinking about water...82%A brain-in-a-vat would not have satisfied the causal constraints on ha...81%Given content externalism, Warfield cannot have a priori knowledge of ...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: skepticism-content-externalism
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    Given content externalism, then, Warfield cannot have the desired a priori knowledge of premise 1 (“I think that water is wet”). Does this mean that his use of premise 1 begs the question? Apparently so. Certainly, from a Putnamian point of view, the question is begged. For on that point of view, one could not have warrant for premise 1 unless one had warrant to believe that (unlike a BIV) one had satisfied the causal constraints on having the concept water. Thus it would seem that—absent any a
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit