From a Putnamian point of view, one could not have warrant for the belief 'I think that water is wet' unless one had warrant to believe that one had satisfied the causal constraints on having the concept water
A mental representation formed from copies of sensory representations, assembled in accordance with general-purpose learning rules.
warrant(Toulmin's model of argumentation)
An implicit premise that an argument depends on, which licenses the move from evidence to conclusion; in this context, the unstated assumption that normal misdemeanor penalties are insufficient as a deterrent.
Given content externalism, then, Warfield cannot have the desired a priori knowledge of premise 1 (“I think that water is wet”). Does this mean that his use of premise 1 begs the question? Apparently so. Certainly, from a Putnamian point of view, the question is begged. For on that point of view, one could not have warrant for premise 1 unless one had warrant to believe that (unlike a BIV) one had satisfied the causal constraints on having the concept water. Thus it would seem that—absent any a