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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    A defense against the problem of evil does not require a ... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    A defense against the problem of evil does not require a story that can be shown to be likely true; it only requires a story that, for all we know, is not unlikely.

    Problem of Evil
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Even if a defensive story has some probability relative to our evidential base, we may not be able to determine what that probability is, or even any reasonably delimited range in which it falls.
      ?

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    • 2.If we cannot determine the probability of the story, then it cannot be shown that the story is likely to be true, but neither can it be shown that the story is unlikely to be true.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Rowe's evidential argument establishes that the mere logical possibility of a story does not neutralize its evidential weight against theism.
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    • 2.When observed suffering appears gratuitous across a wide inductive base, the epistemic burden shifts to theists to provide positively probable theodicies, not merely possible ones.
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    • 3.A story that is neither confirmable nor disconfirmable contributes nothing to closing the probabilistic gap opened by apparently pointless evil.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wykstra's CORNEA principle, which Plantinga's claim implicitly echoes, requires that we assess whether we are in a good epistemic position to detect God's reasons before inferring their absence.
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    • 2.If our cognitive limitations prevent us from assigning probabilities to defensive stories, those same limitations equally prevent us from asserting the stories are 'not unlikely', making the asymmetric epistemic privilege claimed by the defense illegitimate.
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    Topics

    Problem of Evil

    Related

    A story that is neither confirmable nor disconfirmable contributes nothing to cl...Even if a defensive story has some probability relative to our evidential base, ...If our cognitive limitations prevent us from assigning probabilities to defensiv...If we cannot determine the probability of the story, then it cannot be shown tha...
    +3 moreShow less
    Rowe's evidential argument establishes that the mere logical possibility of a st...When observed suffering appears gratuitous across a wide inductive base, the epi...Wykstra's CORNEA principle, which Plantinga's claim implicitly echoes, requires ...

    Similar

    The story involved in a defense must be one that is likely to be true.80%If we cannot determine the probability of the story, then it cannot be...79%The argument from evil should be formulated as an evidential (inductiv...77%Even if a defensive story has some probability relative to our evident...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: evil
    View source passageHide passage
    The prospects for a successful abstract version of the argument from evil would seem, therefore, rather problematic. It is conceivable, of course, that the correct moral principles entail that there cannot be any evils whose actuality or possibility makes for a better world. But to attempt to set out a version of the argument from evil that requires a defense of that thesis is certainly to swim upstream. A much more promising approach, surely, is to focus, instead, simply upon those evils that are thought, by the vast majority of people, to pose at least a prima facie problem for the rationa...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit