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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that A defense against the problem of evil does not require a story that can be shown to be likely true; it only requires a story that, for all we know, is not unlikely.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Rowe's evidential argument establishes that the mere logical possibility of a story does not neutralize its evidential weight against theism.
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    • 2.When observed suffering appears gratuitous across a wide inductive base, the epistemic burden shifts to theists to provide positively probable theodicies, not merely possible ones.
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    • 3.A story that is neither confirmable nor disconfirmable contributes nothing to closing the probabilistic gap opened by apparently pointless evil.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Wykstra's CORNEA principle, which Plantinga's claim implicitly echoes, requires that we assess whether we are in a good epistemic position to detect God's reasons before inferring their absence.
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    • 2.If our cognitive limitations prevent us from assigning probabilities to defensive stories, those same limitations equally prevent us from asserting the stories are 'not unlikely', making the asymmetric epistemic privilege claimed by the defense illegitimate.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Even if a defensive story has some probability relative to our evidential base, we may not be able to determine what that probability is, or even any reasonably delimited range in which it falls.
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    • 2.If we cannot determine the probability of the story, then it cannot be shown that the story is likely to be true, but neither can it be shown that the story is unlikely to be true.
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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.