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    A person x existing at one time is the same thing as some... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
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    Supports→Personal identity over time is constituted by psychological continuity rather than memory alone

    A person x existing at one time is the same thing as something y existing at another time if and only if x is psychologically continuous with y

    Personal Identity
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    Personal Identity

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    Personal identity over time is constituted by psychological continuity rather th...The psychological continuity criterion avoids the most obvious objections to the...

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    Now suppose that a person x who exists at one time is the same thing as something y existing at another time if and only if x is, at the one time, psychologically continuous with y as it is at the other time. This avoids the most obvious objections to the memory criterion.

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