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    Personal identity over time is constituted by psychologic... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Personal identity over time is constituted by psychological continuity rather than memory alone

    Personal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.A person x existing at one time is the same thing as something y existing at another time if and only if x is psychologically continuous with y
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    • 2.The psychological continuity criterion avoids the most obvious objections to the memory criterion of personal identity
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Psychological continuity admits of degrees, making it unsuitable as a criterion for the all-or-nothing relation of numerical identity.
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    • 2.If personal identity can be 'more or less,' then survival across fission cases yields two equally valid successors, violating identity's transitivity.
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    • 3.Parfit's own conclusion—that what matters is not identity but psychological continuity—concedes that this criterion replaces rather than constitutes personal identity.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Bodily and biological continuity grounds psychological continuity causally, making the psychological relation derivative rather than constitutive of personal identity.
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    • 2.Animalists like Olson argue we are fundamentally human organisms, so personal identity must track the persistence conditions of biological entities, not mental states.
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    Topics

    Personal Identity

    Related

    A person x existing at one time is the same thing as something y existing at ano...Animalists like Olson argue we are fundamentally human organisms, so personal id...Bodily and biological continuity grounds psychological continuity causally, maki...If personal identity can be 'more or less,' then survival across fission cases y...
    +3 moreShow less
    Parfit's own conclusion—that what matters is not identity but psychological cont...Psychological continuity admits of degrees, making it unsuitable as a criterion ...The psychological continuity criterion avoids the most obvious objections to the...

    Similar

    Personal identity over time consists in psychological continuity — bei...94%Under Parfit's Moderate Claim, psychological continuity matters as muc...89%The psychological continuity criterion avoids the most obvious objecti...88%Episodic memory is logically sufficient for personal identity across t...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: identity-personal
    View source passageHide passage
    Now suppose that a person x who exists at one time is the same thing as something y existing at another time if and only if x is, at the one time, psychologically continuous with y as it is at the other time. This avoids the most obvious objections to the memory criterion.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit