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    If two psychological states are incapable of causing anyt... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    If two psychological states are incapable of causing anything different to happen, then the two psychological states must be the same.

    CausationConsciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Methodological individualism holds that psychological states are individuated with respect to their causal powers.
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    • 2.If one psychological state cannot cause anything different than another, they share identical causal powers.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Block's distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness demonstrates that qualia can vary without any corresponding variation in functional or causal role.
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    • 2.A phenomenal zombie and a conscious being share identical causal powers by definition, yet Chalmers argues they instantiate distinct psychological states.
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    • 3.Therefore causal indiscernibility is compatible with genuine psychological difference, falsifying the biconditional the claim presupposes.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Putnam's Twin Earth cases show that mental states with identical causal profiles can differ in content due to environmental factors outside the individual.
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    • 2.If two states share all causal powers yet differ in meaning, causal equivalence cannot be sufficient for state identity.
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    Consciousness & MindCausation

    Related

    A phenomenal zombie and a conscious being share identical causal powers by defin...Block's distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness demonstrates tha...If one psychological state cannot cause anything different than another, they sh...If two states share all causal powers yet differ in meaning, causal equivalence ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Methodological individualism holds that psychological states are individuated wi...Putnam's Twin Earth cases show that mental states with identical causal profiles...Therefore causal indiscernibility is compatible with genuine psychological diffe...

    Similar

    If one psychological state cannot cause anything different than anothe...94%Two psychological states may be identical even if one is true in some ...90%Two mental states can share identical causal roles yet differ in their...85%The two accounts describe significantly different psychological states83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: methodological-individualism
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    The issue comes down to one concerning the individuation of mental states. How do we determine what is and is not the “same” belief? Fodor begins by introducing the constraint that he calls “methodological individualism,” viz., “the doctrine that psychological states are individuated with respect to their causal powers” (1987, 42). This implies, among other things, that if one psychological state is incapable of causing anything different to happen than some other psychological state, then the t
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit