Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    A thing's being good is a necessary condition for the wil... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→The will is not compelled by a thing's being good.

    A thing's being good is a necessary condition for the will to will it, but not a sufficient condition.

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeMoral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Virtue Ethics1 linked

    Related

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Moral Responsibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    A necessary condition alone does not compel an act.The will is an appetite for the good, so whatever the will wills, it wills a goo...The will is not compelled by a thing's being good.

    Similar

    The will is not compelled by a thing's being good.85%The will is an appetite for the good, so whatever the will wills, it w...82%God is not necessitated to actualize every good that God has the power...78%Reason operates on a broader notion of good, i.e., what is good all th...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: philip-chancellor
    View source passageHide passage
    Philip modifies this position (McCluskey 2001). He thinks that only the final activity of the intellect is performed freely, that is, the final judgment about what course of action to take. This is because Philip thinks that with respect to the previous activities of the intellect, activities such as identifying possible courses of action and deliberating over them, the intellect suffers from certain constraints. These constraints have to do with the structure of the world around us which in tu

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective