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    Made withinDC&Austin
    The will is not compelled by a thing's being good. — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The will is not compelled by a thing's being good.

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeMoral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The will is an appetite for the good, so whatever the will wills, it wills a good.
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    • 2.A thing's being good is a necessary condition for the will to will it, but not a sufficient condition.
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    • 3.A necessary condition alone does not compel an act.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.When the intellect presents an object as absolutely and comprehensively good, the will is necessitated toward it, as Aquinas argues regarding the beatific vision.
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    • 2.If the will can be necessitated by a sufficiently complete presentation of goodness, then goodness itself—not merely the will's spontaneity—functions as a compelling cause in determinate cases.
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    • 3.Philip's claim conflates the general case of partial goods with the limiting case where goodness is total, undermining the universal scope of his conclusion.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason entails that the will's choice among goods must itself have a determining reason, which is ultimately the perceived superior goodness of the chosen object.
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    • 2.If the degree of perceived goodness is always the sufficient reason for volition, then goodness compels the will in the sense that no alternative could have been chosen given the same cognitive state.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Virtue Ethics1 linked

    Related

    A necessary condition alone does not compel an act.A thing's being good is a necessary condition for the will to will it, but not a...If the degree of perceived goodness is always the sufficient reason for volition...If the will can be necessitated by a sufficiently complete presentation of goodn...
    +4 moreShow less
    Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason entails that the will's choice among go...Philip's claim conflates the general case of partial goods with the limiting cas...The will is an appetite for the good, so whatever the will wills, it wills a goo...When the intellect presents an object as absolutely and comprehensively good, th...

    Similar

    The will is an appetite for the good, so whatever the will wills, it w...85%A thing's being good is a necessary condition for the will to will it,...85%The will is a kind of cause, since willing causes action.81%A will that is free in the negative sense does not operate through the...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: philip-chancellor
    View source passageHide passage
    Philip modifies this position (McCluskey 2001). He thinks that only the final activity of the intellect is performed freely, that is, the final judgment about what course of action to take. This is because Philip thinks that with respect to the previous activities of the intellect, activities such as identifying possible courses of action and deliberating over them, the intellect suffers from certain constraints. These constraints have to do with the structure of the world around us which in tu
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit