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    All pramāṇas possess the property of being pramāṇas intri... — Carmelics
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    All pramāṇas possess the property of being pramāṇas intrinsically (svataḥ prāmāṇya).

    Truth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons against

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    Reasons For

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    • 1.A capacity not already existing by itself cannot be produced by anything else.
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    • 2.If a cognition's status as a reliable warrant required demonstration by a subsequent cognition, that subsequent cognition would itself require justification, generating an infinite regress.
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    • 3.If the initial cognition is not credited with the intrinsic capacity for conferring justification, no further cognition could bestow that capacity either—unless the further cognition is itself credited with immediately having that capacity.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
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    • 1.A cognition's reliability is a relational property concerning its correspondence to external states of affairs, not an intrinsic feature of the cognition itself.
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    • 2.Dharmakīrti's apoha theory demonstrates that cognitions are individuated by their causal-functional roles, which are determined extrinsically through perceptual feedback and successful action.
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    • 3.Therefore, prāmāṇya cannot be self-certifying because the very conditions that make a cognition truth-tracking are constituted by factors outside the cognition's intrinsic character.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kumārila's regress argument against extrinsic justification proves too much: it equally undermines the possibility of error-detection, since recognizing a cognition as false also requires a subsequent cognition.
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    • 2.Kumārila himself concedes that parataḥ aprāmāṇya—extrinsic defeat of cognitions—is legitimate, meaning external factors can strip a cognition of its warranted status.
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    • 3.A theory that makes prāmāṇya intrinsic but aprāmāṇya extrinsic is asymmetric in a way that privileges confirmation over falsification without principled justification, rendering the account epistemically self-serving rather than truth-conducive.
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    Connections

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    Skepticism3 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A capacity not already existing by itself cannot be produced by anything else.A cognition's reliability is a relational property concerning its correspondence...A theory that makes prāmāṇya intrinsic but aprāmāṇya extrinsic is asymmetric in ...Dharmakīrti's apoha theory demonstrates that cognitions are individuated by thei...
    +6 moreShow less
    If a cognition's status as a reliable warrant required demonstration by a subseq...If a further cognition can be credited with immediately having the justificatory...If the initial cognition is not credited with the intrinsic capacity for conferr...Kumārila himself concedes that parataḥ aprāmāṇya—extrinsic defeat of cognitions—...Kumārila's regress argument against extrinsic justification proves too much: it ...Therefore, prāmāṇya cannot be self-certifying because the very conditions that m...

    Similar

    Things-in-themselves possess absolutely intrinsic properties.89%Forces are not absolutely intrinsic properties82%Paull and Sider stipulate that B contains only intrinsic properties P ...81%This principle is similar to one appealed to in the argument that intr...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: kumaarila
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    The locus classicus for Kumārila’s argument here is verse 47 of the codanā sūtra chapter of the Ślokavārttika:  “It should be understood that all pramāṇas’ have the property of being pramāṇas intrinsically; for a capacity not already existing by itself (svataḥ) cannot be produced by anything else.” (All of the passages given here from Kumārila and his commentators can be found in Arnold 2005, 57–114.) The argument Kumārila concisely expresses here in verse form is straightforward but compelling
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit