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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that All pramāṇas possess the property of being pramāṇas intrinsically (svataḥ prāmāṇya).

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.A cognition's reliability is a relational property concerning its correspondence to external states of affairs, not an intrinsic feature of the cognition itself.
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    • 2.Dharmakīrti's apoha theory demonstrates that cognitions are individuated by their causal-functional roles, which are determined extrinsically through perceptual feedback and successful action.
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    • 3.Therefore, prāmāṇya cannot be self-certifying because the very conditions that make a cognition truth-tracking are constituted by factors outside the cognition's intrinsic character.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kumārila's regress argument against extrinsic justification proves too much: it equally undermines the possibility of error-detection, since recognizing a cognition as false also requires a subsequent cognition.
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    • 2.Kumārila himself concedes that parataḥ aprāmāṇya—extrinsic defeat of cognitions—is legitimate, meaning external factors can strip a cognition of its warranted status.
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    • 3.A theory that makes prāmāṇya intrinsic but aprāmāṇya extrinsic is asymmetric in a way that privileges confirmation over falsification without principled justification, rendering the account epistemically self-serving rather than truth-conducive.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.A capacity not already existing by itself cannot be produced by anything else.
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    • 2.If a cognition's status as a reliable warrant required demonstration by a subsequent cognition, that subsequent cognition would itself require justification, generating an infinite regress.
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    • 3.If the initial cognition is not credited with the intrinsic capacity for conferring justification, no further cognition could bestow that capacity either—unless the further cognition is itself credited with immediately having that capacity.
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