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    The identity theorist need not use the word 'mental' in t... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The identity theorist need not use the word 'mental' in the topic-neutral formula

    Consciousness & Mind
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.To be topic-neutral is to be applicable to both physical and mental domains, as arithmetic is applicable without being inherently physical or mental
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    • 2.The word 'mental' in ordinary usage is a grab-bag term covering heterogeneous cases such as 'mental arithmetic' and 'mental illness'
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    • 3.An identity theorist finds no trouble with the ordinary, non-theoretical uses of 'mental'
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Topic-neutral formulas must still individuate the target phenomena, and 'mental' carries irreducible intentional content that no neutral descriptor captures.
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    • 2.Chalmers' hard problem shows phenomenal consciousness has intrinsic qualitative character that resists re-description in topic-neutral causal-functional terms.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's modal argument establishes that 'pain' is a rigid designator picking out its referent by essential phenomenal character, not contingent causal role.
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    • 2.If mental terms rigidly designate phenomenal properties, then substituting topic-neutral functional descriptions changes the subject matter rather than remaining neutral about it.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    An identity theorist finds no trouble with the ordinary, non-theoretical uses of...Chalmers' hard problem shows phenomenal consciousness has intrinsic qualitative ...If mental terms rigidly designate phenomenal properties, then substituting topic...Kripke's modal argument establishes that 'pain' is a rigid designator picking ou...
    +3 moreShow less
    The word 'mental' in ordinary usage is a grab-bag term covering heterogeneous ca...To be topic-neutral is to be applicable to both physical and mental domains, as ...Topic-neutral formulas must still individuate the target phenomena, and 'mental'...

    Similar

    An identity theorist finds no trouble with the ordinary, non-theoretic...90%The mind-brain identity theory can be established without relying on p...80%Construing the characteristically mental properties of experiences as ...78%Dualistic theories and mind-brain identity theories do not tie mental ...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: mind-identity
    View source passageHide passage
    Quoting these passages, David Chalmers (1996, p. 360) objects that if ‘something is going on’ is construed broadly enough it is inadequate, and if it is construed narrowly enough to cover only experiential states (or processes) it is not sufficient for the conclusion. Smart would counter this by stressing the word ‘typically’. Of course a lot of things go on in me when I have a yellow after image (for example my heart is pumping blood through my brain). However they do not typically go on then:
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit