Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Any axiological formulation of the argument from evil is ... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Any axiological formulation of the argument from evil is incomplete in a crucial respect.

    Problem of Evil
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • The axiological formulation fails to make explicit how a failure to bring about good states of affairs, or a failure to prevent bad states of affairs, entails that one is acting in a morally wrong way.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Axiological arguments can be self-sufficient if the normative gap is bridged by widely accepted background assumptions about rational agency and goodness.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Rowe's 1979 evidential argument operates axiologically by inferring from the existence of pointless suffering to the improbability of omnipotence plus perfect goodness, without requiring a separate deontological premise.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A being whose nature just is perfect goodness is logically compelled to act on that goodness, collapsing the axiological-deontological distinction for the theistic God specifically.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Consequentialist moral frameworks, defended by Mill and later Parfit, entail that the wrongness of an act just is constituted by its axiological deficit, making deontological supplementation redundant.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If consequentialism is even a serious candidate moral theory, then the claim that axiological formulations are necessarily incomplete presupposes a contested internalist deontological framework without justification.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Problem of Evil

    Related

    A being whose nature just is perfect goodness is logically compelled to act on t...Axiological arguments can be self-sufficient if the normative gap is bridged by ...Consequentialist moral frameworks, defended by Mill and later Parfit, entail tha...If consequentialism is even a serious candidate moral theory, then the claim tha...
    +2 moreShow less
    Rowe's 1979 evidential argument operates axiologically by inferring from the exi...The axiological formulation fails to make explicit how a failure to bring about ...

    Similar

    The advocate of the argument from evil needs to be able to show that t...82%The argument from evil should be formulated as an evidential (inductiv...82%The argument from evil may or may not be sound, since one or more of i...81%The axiological formulation fails to make explicit how a failure to br...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: evil
    View source passageHide passage
    That Plantinga initially focused upon abstract formulations of the argument from evil was not, perhaps, surprising, given that a number of writers—including Mackie, H. J. McCloskey (1960), and H. D. Aiken (1957–58)—had defended incompatibility versions of the argument from evil, and it is natural to formulate such arguments in an abstract way, since although one may wish to distinguish, for example, between natural evils and moral evils, reference to concrete cases of evil would not seem to add anything. But once one shifts to probabilistic formulations of the argument from evil, the situatio...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit