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    Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is one only... — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
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    Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is one only accidentally

    Divine Attributes
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    Any thing other than God that is called 'one' can be one only through participat...Whatever is one only accidentally must derive its unity from something external ...

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    Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is one only accidentally...99%Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is one only improperly o...92%Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is many as well as one91%The one is one (from Oneness or Self-Predication)84%

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    AI-extracted
    SEP: al-farabi-metaphysics
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    Main themes of the treatise include distinguishing a whole family of senses of “one” (in a few cases Fârâbî also gives the corresponding senses of the abstract “unity”), but also and especially distinguishing different ways that senses of “one” are related to senses of “many”. The treatise can read like a dry catalogue, and Fârâbî rarely gives arguments or admits that his claims might be controversial, but it is often clear that he has an opponent in mind. That opponent might be a type rather th

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