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    Any thing other than God that is called 'one' can be one ... — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Any thing other than God that is called 'one' can be one only through participation in a unity extrinsic to it

    Divine AttributesNatural Theology
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is one only accidentally, not essentially
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    • 2.Whatever is one only accidentally must derive its unity from something external to it
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aristotle's hylomorphic theory holds that composite substances are unified per se through form, not by participating in an external unity.
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    • 2.If substantial form confers unity intrinsically upon a composite, then creatures need not receive unity from something extrinsic to their own natures.
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    • 3.Avicenna's distinction between necessary and contingent existence already accounts for creaturely dependence without requiring that their unity specifically be extrinsic.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Spinoza's substance monism entails that finite modes possess intrinsic unity as determinate expressions of the one infinite substance.
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    • 2.If creaturely unity is simply a modal expression of divine unity rather than an extrinsic participation in it, the claim conflates ontological dependence with extrinsic derivation.
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    Topics

    Divine AttributesNatural Theology

    Connections

    1 topic

    Proof of definition segments2 linked

    Related

    Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is one only accidentallyAristotle's hylomorphic theory holds that composite substances are unified per s...Avicenna's distinction between necessary and contingent existence already accoun...If creaturely unity is simply a modal expression of divine unity rather than an ...
    +3 moreShow less
    If substantial form confers unity intrinsically upon a composite, then creatures...Spinoza's substance monism entails that finite modes possess intrinsic unity as ...Whatever is one only accidentally must derive its unity from something external ...

    Similar

    God's unity is unlike the unity of any other thing called 'one'90%Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is many as well as one83%Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is one only improperly o...82%Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is one only accidentally...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: al-farabi-metaphysics
    View source passageHide passage
    Main themes of the treatise include distinguishing a whole family of senses of “one” (in a few cases Fârâbî also gives the corresponding senses of the abstract “unity”), but also and especially distinguishing different ways that senses of “one” are related to senses of “many”. The treatise can read like a dry catalogue, and Fârâbî rarely gives arguments or admits that his claims might be controversial, but it is often clear that he has an opponent in mind. That opponent might be a type rather th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit