Aristotle's original sea-battle argument(De Interpretatione 9) establishes that bivalence failure for future contingents is motivated by blocking logical fatalism, and theological fatalism inherits the same structural problem.
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The idea that the laws of logic force certain events to happen—meaning the future is already determined by logical necessity, not just by physical causes.
Sea-battle argument(the specific argument being referenced)
A famous thought experiment where Aristotle asks: if it's definitely true right now that a sea battle will happen tomorrow, does that mean it *has* to happen? Or can the future still be open and uncertain?
Theological fatalism(the main argument being referenced)
The idea that if God knows the future perfectly, then the future is already fixed and unavoidable—nothing we do can change what will happen.
bivalence(Stoic logic; Chrysippus's position on contingent future propositions)
The truth table defining logical connectives contains only two values, true and false; every proposition is either true or false.