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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    The denial of future contingent truth is not sufficient t... — Carmelics
    Home/Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    The denial of future contingent truth is not sufficient to avoid the problem of theological fatalism.

    Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.On open theist accounts (Hasker, Pinnock), God's omniscience is limited to all knowable truths, and indeterminate future contingents are not knowable truths for anyone.
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    • 2.If no truth-bearer exists regarding future contingents, God's infallibility cannot generate a binding belief-state about them, since infallibility governs accuracy, not scope of belief.
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    • 3.The quasi-truth move presupposes a robust truthmaker for 'quasi-true' propositions, but without such a truthmaker, quasi-truth collapses into a relabeling that does not restore the fatalist inference.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aristotle's original sea-battle argument (De Interpretatione 9) establishes that bivalence failure for future contingents is motivated by blocking logical fatalism, and theological fatalism inherits the same structural problem.
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    • 2.If the denial of future contingent truth dissolves the fatalist inference in the logical case, theological fatalism requires an additional premise—God's infallible belief—that itself presupposes a determinate truth to track.
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    • 3.Since theological fatalism is a stronger thesis that logically depends on logical fatalism's presuppositions, any solution dissolving the latter undermines the former's foundational structure.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Future contingents that fail to be true for presentist reasons alone might nevertheless qualify as 'quasi-true', and the quasi-truth of God's beliefs about the future is enough to generate the problem.
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    • 2.If God is infallible in all his beliefs, then it is not possible that God believes T and T is either false or becomes false. If so, and if God believes T, we get an argument for theological fatalism that parallels the basic argument.
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    Free Will & Foreknowledge

    Related

    Aristotle's original sea-battle argument (De Interpretatione 9) establishes that...Future contingents that fail to be true for presentist reasons alone might never...If God is infallible in all his beliefs, then it is not possible that God believ...If no truth-bearer exists regarding future contingents, God's infallibility cann...
    +4 moreShow less
    If the denial of future contingent truth dissolves the fatalist inference in the...On open theist accounts (Hasker, Pinnock), God's omniscience is limited to all k...Since theological fatalism is a stronger thesis that logically depends on logica...The quasi-truth move presupposes a robust truthmaker for 'quasi-true' propositio...

    Similar

    A successful Ockhamist response to theological fatalism need not await...87%The soundness of the argument for theological fatalism must not be obv...84%Middle Knowledge does not entail the falsehood of any premise of the b...82%The situation is arguably the same when it comes to the argument for t...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: free-will-foreknowledge
    View source passageHide passage
    One more preliminary point is in order. The dilemma of infallible foreknowledge and human free will does not rest on the particular assumption of foreknowledge and does not require an analysis of knowledge. Most contemporary accounts of knowledge are fallibilist, which means they do not require that a person believe in a way that cannot be mistaken in order to have knowledge. She has knowledge just in case what she believes is true and she satisfies the other conditions for knowledge, such as having sufficiently strong evidence. Ordinary knowledge does not require that the belief cannot be fal...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit