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    As in the Prisoner's Dilemma, individual rationality at e... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
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    Supports→The Pareto superior outcome (4, 5) at the terminal node descending from node 7 is not reached in equilibrium

    As in the Prisoner's Dilemma, individual rationality at each decision point prevents collectively superior outcomes

    ConsequentialismProblem of Evil
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    Problem of EvilConsequentialism

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    Backward induction (Zermelo's algorithm) determines rational play at each nodeThe Pareto superior outcome (4, 5) at the terminal node descending from node 7 i...The rational choices at each decision node lead to a Nash Equilibrium path that ...

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    Global rationality is a reasonable normative standard but problematic ...77%Contractualism with the individualist restriction diverges from utilit...77%So-called 'world Bayesian' versions of decision theory, such as Richar...77%A's choice of O1 is rational given the outcomes produced by each avail...75%

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    SEP: game-theory
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    Now apply Zermelo’s algorithm to the extensive form of our current example. Begin, again, with the last subgame, that descending from node 7. This is Player I’s move, and she would choose R because she prefers her payoff of 5 to the payoff of 4 she gets by playing L. Therefore, we assign the payoff (5, −1) to node 7. Thus at node 6 II faces a choice between (−1, 0) and (5, −1). He chooses L. At node 5 II chooses R. At node 4 I is thus choosing between (0, 5) and (−1, 0), and so plays L. Note tha

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