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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' violate the condition that one can only intend one's own action.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to the intentionality of joint action.
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    • 2.One can only intend one's own action, not the actions of others.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Davidson's agency theory holds that intentional action requires the agent's own causal-motivational states to directly produce the relevant behavior.
      ?

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    • 2.When I intend 'that we X,' the completion condition extends to another agent's autonomous actions, which my mental states cannot causally guarantee.
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    • 3.An intention whose satisfaction necessarily depends on another's unconstrained agency is structurally distinct from genuine intention and is better classified as a wish or hope.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Anscombe's account in 'Intention' ties intending to what is 'up to' the agent—the domain over which the agent exercises practical control.
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    • 2.Another person's voluntary actions fall outside one's domain of practical control by virtue of their status as autonomous rational agents.
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    • 3.Therefore, 'I intend that we X' either covertly reduces to 'I intend my own contributory actions' or it misapplies the concept of intention to a domain logic cannot support.
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