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    Bratman's account of shared intention is defective becaus... — Carmelics
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    Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' violate the condition that one can only intend one's own action.

    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Davidson's agency theory holds that intentional action requires the agent's own causal-motivational states to directly produce the relevant behavior.
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    • 2.When I intend 'that we X,' the completion condition extends to another agent's autonomous actions, which my mental states cannot causally guarantee.
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    • 3.An intention whose satisfaction necessarily depends on another's unconstrained agency is structurally distinct from genuine intention and is better classified as a wish or hope.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Anscombe's account in 'Intention' ties intending to what is 'up to' the agent—the domain over which the agent exercises practical control.
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    • 2.Another person's voluntary actions fall outside one's domain of practical control by virtue of their status as autonomous rational agents.
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    • 3.Therefore, 'I intend that we X' either covertly reduces to 'I intend my own contributory actions' or it misapplies the concept of intention to a domain logic cannot support.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to the intentionality of joint action.
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    • 2.One can only intend one's own action, not the actions of others.
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    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language

    Related

    An intention whose satisfaction necessarily depends on another's unconstrained a...Another person's voluntary actions fall outside one's domain of practical contro...Anscombe's account in 'Intention' ties intending to what is 'up to' the agent—th...Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to the inten...
    +4 moreShow less
    Davidson's agency theory holds that intentional action requires the agent's own ...One can only intend one's own action, not the actions of others.Therefore, 'I intend that we X' either covertly reduces to 'I intend my own cont...When I intend 'that we X,' the completion condition extends to another agent's a...

    Similar

    Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions ...99%Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions ...97%Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to...85%One can only intend one's own action, not the actions of others.81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: collective-intentionality
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    Thus, the claim here is that intentions of the form “I intend that we X” are basic to the intentionality of joint action. Critics have argued that Bratman’s account is defective in so far as it treats intentions of that form as basic, since they violate either (1) the condition that one can only intend one’s own action, or (2) the condition that one can only control one’s own and no other agent’s actions, or (3) the condition that one can only intend what one can take to be in a position to sett
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit