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    There must be a difference in the world between the prope... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    There must be a difference in the world between the properties that the old and new concepts of color experience stand for or denote.

    Consciousness & Mind
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The difference between the old concept (of red as known through physical description) and the new concept (of red as experienced) is substantial enough to indicate a difference in the properties these concepts refer to.
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    • 2.Mary knew some of these properties while in her cell, but becomes cognizant of others only upon her release.
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    • 3.For Mary to make a real discovery, she must come to associate with the experience of red new qualities she did not associate with it in her room.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.A difference in concepts or modes of presentation does not entail a difference in the properties or referents those concepts pick out (Frege's sense/reference distinction supports this).
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    • 2.Mary may acquire a new phenomenal concept of the same physical property she already knew under a physical description, just as 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' differ conceptually but refer to the same object.
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    • 3.Brian Loar and others argue that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that directly refer to physical-functional states, so no new ontological property is introduced by the new concept.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.David Lewis and Lawrence Nemirow's ability hypothesis holds that Mary gains new know-how—abilities to recognize, imagine, and remember color—not knowledge of new propositional facts about distinct properties.
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    • 2.If what Mary acquires upon release is a set of practical abilities rather than propositional knowledge of a new property, the inference from 'new cognitive achievement' to 'new property in the world' is a non sequitur.
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    • 3.The phenomenological novelty of gaining an ability is routinely confused with discovering a new fact, but the confusion is a feature of the cognitive situation, not evidence of ontological novelty.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    A difference in concepts or modes of presentation does not entail a difference i...Brian Loar and others argue that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts ...David Lewis and Lawrence Nemirow's ability hypothesis holds that Mary gains new ...For Mary to make a real discovery, she must come to associate with the experienc...
    +5 moreShow less
    If what Mary acquires upon release is a set of practical abilities rather than p...Mary knew some of these properties while in her cell, but becomes cognizant of o...Mary may acquire a new phenomenal concept of the same physical property she alre...The difference between the old concept (of red as known through physical descrip...The phenomenological novelty of gaining an ability is routinely confused with di...

    Similar

    The difference between the old concept (of red as known through physic...83%Beliefs about the colors of objects are based on experiences that repr...82%These experiential features are different from reflectances (the physi...79%Color experiences represent objects as having hue magnitudes, and thes...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: qualia
    View source passageHide passage
    Some philosophers insist that the difference between the old and the new concepts in this case is such that there must be a difference in the world between the properties these concepts stand for or denote (Jackson 1993, Chalmers 1996). Some of these properties Mary knew in her cell; others she becomes cognizant of only upon her release. This is necessary for Mary to make a real discovery: she must come to associate with the experience of red new qualities she did not associate with it in her ro
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit