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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    Ceteris paribus laws are sufficient to ground the claim t... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

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    Supports→An agent could have done otherwise even under determinism

    Ceteris paribus laws are sufficient to ground the claim that an agent could have done otherwise

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeMoral Responsibility
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Causation1 linked

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    Modality & Possibility
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    Related

    An agent could have done otherwise even under determinismNot all laws of nature are deterministicThe brain operates based on ceteris paribus laws that include a clause for the a...

    Similar

    An agent may be justified or excused even when the action itself is no...74%An agent is genuinely able to do something only if the agent has shown...74%Deontological justification cannot suffice for an agent to have a just...73%Metaphysical possibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition f...73%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: causation-backwards
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    Indeed, the compatibilist will accept (1), because even an advocate of backward causation does not claim that the past can be changed. Moreover, the compatibilist does not have to accept backward causation. Most likely the compatibilist will not challenge the non-compatibilist by saying that we may be able to influence the past. It is much more likely that the compatibilist will object to the argument either by saying that not all laws of nature are deterministic or by saying that the brain oper

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