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    Carmelics

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    Chalmers' conceivability of philosophical zombies demonst... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If physicalism is true and S summarizes the total nature of the world, then S# is already implicitly included in S, making the proposition S# merely an expansion of S rather than an independent claim.

    Chalmers' conceivability of philosophical zombies demonstrates that S can be true while S# remains epistemically independent, undermining the claim of mere expansion.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Zombies are coherently conceivable: we can imagine beings physically identical to us yet lacking consciousness.
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    • 2.If S (physical facts) and S# (consciousness facts) were merely expanding descriptions of the same reality, S# would be deducible from S.
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    • 3.The epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal properties shows consciousness adds genuinely new information beyond physical expansion.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility; we can coherently imagine scenarios that are actually impossible.
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    • 2.The epistemic gap reflects limitations in human deduction, not metaphysical independence of consciousness from physical properties.
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    • 3.S# may be necessitated by S once we fully understand consciousness, making apparent independence an artifact of incomplete analysis.
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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility; we can coherently imagi...If S (physical facts) and S# (consciousness facts) were merely expanding descrip...If physicalism is true and S summarizes the total nature of the world, then S# i...S# may be necessitated by S once we fully understand consciousness, making appar...
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    The epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal properties shows consciousness...The epistemic gap reflects limitations in human deduction, not metaphysical inde...Zombies are coherently conceivable: we can imagine beings physically identical t...

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    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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    1 edit