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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Color experiences involve massive error if the relevant f... — Carmelics
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    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Color experiences involve massive error if the relevant features of similarity and difference are features of the experiences themselves rather than features presented in experience.

    Consciousness & MindPerception
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Phenomenal color spaces (hue circles, opponent axes) are structures of experience, yet we unreflectively project these structures onto mind-independent surfaces.
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    • 2.Boghossian and Velleman (1989) show that color experience represents objects as having properties that nothing actually instantiates, constituting systematic representational error.
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    • 3.When naïve perceivers judge 'red resembles orange more than blue,' they take themselves to be tracking objective surface resemblances, not classifying their own qualia—so the mismatch is a genuine error, not mere misdescription.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Hardin's eliminativist argument establishes that inter-observer metameric variation shows no single mind-independent similarity relation corresponds to perceived hue ordering.
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    • 2.If similarity relations among colors are fixed by neural opponent-process structures rather than by physical reflectance properties, then color similarity judgments have false presuppositions about their own subject matter.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Judgments of color similarity and difference (e.g., red is more similar to orange than to blue) are applied to colors, not to our experiences of colors.
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    • 2.If the relevant features stand in relations of similarity and difference are features of the experiences themselves, then we are misapplying those judgments.
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    Topics

    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

    Key Terms

    Color experiences(as used in philosophy of perception)
    The subjective way colors appear to your mind when you see them—like how red looks to you personally, not just the physical light wavelengths.
    Features of similarity and difference(as used in philosophy of perception)
    The qualities that make two things alike or unlike each other—for example, what makes two shades of red similar to each other, or different from blue.
    Features of the experiences themselves(as used in philosophy of mind)
    Qualities that exist within your mental experience or perception—properties that are part of how the experience feels or appears to you.
    Features presented in experience(as used in philosophy of perception)
    Qualities that appear to you through experience but exist in the outside world, rather than being created by your mind.
    Massive error(as used in epistemology (theory of knowledge))
    A fundamental, widespread mistake—like if our understanding of something turns out to be deeply and completely wrong.

    Related

    Boghossian and Velleman (1989) show that color experience represents objects as ...Hardin's eliminativist argument establishes that inter-observer metameric variat...If similarity relations among colors are fixed by neural opponent-process struct...If the relevant features stand in relations of similarity and difference are fea...
    +3 moreShow less
    Judgments of color similarity and difference (e.g., red is more similar to orang...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: color
    View source passageHide passage
    The claim, here, is that what it is like to for something to look red is more similar to what it is like for something to look orange than it is to what it is like for something to look blue. This solution, however, raises the question of what features of the experience are relevant ones, i.e., are the features which stand in the relations of similarity and difference. There seem to be two possibilities: (i) they are features of the experiences themselves; (ii) they are features presented in exp
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Phenomenal color spaces (hue circles, opponent axes) are structures of experienc...
    When naïve perceivers judge 'red resembles orange more than blue,' they take the...

    Similar

    If the relevant features stand in relations of similarity and differen...85%Bodily experiences should not be understood in perceptual terms.78%If the relevant features of color similarity and difference are featur...78%Our judgements about change and continuity in experience are less like...78%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit