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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Color experiences involve massive error if the relevant features of similarity and difference are features of the experiences themselves rather than features presented in experience.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Judgments of color similarity and difference (e.g., red is more similar to orange than to blue) are applied to colors, not to our experiences of colors.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the relevant features stand in relations of similarity and difference are features of the experiences themselves, then we are misapplying those judgments.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Phenomenal color spaces (hue circles, opponent axes) are structures of experience, yet we unreflectively project these structures onto mind-independent surfaces.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Boghossian and Velleman (1989) show that color experience represents objects as having properties that nothing actually instantiates, constituting systematic representational error.
      ?

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    • 3.When naïve perceivers judge 'red resembles orange more than blue,' they take themselves to be tracking objective surface resemblances, not classifying their own qualia—so the mismatch is a genuine error, not mere misdescription.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Hardin's eliminativist argument establishes that inter-observer metameric variation shows no single mind-independent similarity relation corresponds to perceived hue ordering.
      ?

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    • 2.If similarity relations among colors are fixed by neural opponent-process structures rather than by physical reflectance properties, then color similarity judgments have false presuppositions about their own subject matter.
      ?

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