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    Conditioned phenomena are conventionally real (categories... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Conditioned phenomena are conventionally real (categories of conventional truth) for ordinary beings

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Ordinary beings erroneously grasp all conditioned phenomena as intrinsically real
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    • 2.Things that are grasped as intrinsically real are conventionally real for those who grasp them as such
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Dignāga and Dharmakīrti hold that only causally efficacious particulars (svalakṣaṇa) are real; universals and conditioned constructs lack this efficacy.
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    • 2.If conventional reality is grounded in erroneous grasping rather than causal efficacy, the two-truths doctrine collapses into a form of anti-realism Dharmakīrti explicitly rejected.
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    • 3.A doctrine requiring ordinary beings' error as the criterion of conventional truth makes conventional truth subject-relative and therefore unable to support inter-subjective epistemic norms.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Erroneous grasping cannot confer ontological status, however conventional, without a mind-independent basis to ground the error itself.
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    • 2.Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā requires that conventional truths function reliably in worldly transactions, which mere error-based grasping cannot guarantee.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Skepticism1 linked

    Related

    A doctrine requiring ordinary beings' error as the criterion of conventional tru...Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā requires that conventional truths function reliably i...Dignāga and Dharmakīrti hold that only causally efficacious particulars (svalakṣ...Erroneous grasping cannot confer ontological status, however conventional, witho...
    +3 moreShow less
    If conventional reality is grounded in erroneous grasping rather than causal eff...Ordinary beings erroneously grasp all conditioned phenomena as intrinsically rea...Things that are grasped as intrinsically real are conventionally real for those ...

    Similar

    Ultimate reality is tied to being that which is conventionally real.83%For noble beings, conditioned phenomena are merely conventional (kun r...83%Denying the intrinsic reality of things at the conventional level enta...81%Believing conventional truths about the arising of phenomena are actua...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: twotruths-india
    View source passageHide passage
    In order to illustrate this distinction, in his commentary [MBh] 6.28 Candrakīrti introduces the concept: mere convention (kun rdzob tsam) of the noble beings to contrast with conventionally real or conventional true (kun rdzob bden pa) of the ordinary beings. Ordinary beings erroneously grasp all conditioned phenomena as intrinsically real, therefore things are conventionally real and thus are categories of conventional truth. For noble beings, however, because they no longer reify them as real
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit