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    CPP does not require the assumption that what Jones does ... — Carmelics
    Home/Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    Supports→CPP is weaker than the claim that Jones' act at t2 causes God's belief at t1.

    CPP does not require the assumption that what Jones does at t2 causes God to have the belief he has at t1.

    Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    Free Will & Foreknowledge

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    CPP is weaker than the claim that Jones' act at t2 causes God's belief at t1.Causation does not reduce to a counterfactual dependency of an effect on its cau...The dependency of God's belief on Jones' act need not be a causal dependency.

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    CPP is weaker than the claim that Jones' act at t2 causes God's belief...90%The dependency of God's belief on Jones' act need not be a causal depe...73%Since God did not believe T yesterday, premise (1), which attributes a...73%It is hard to maintain that God's belief that T is infallible (as clai...73%

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    SEP: free-will-foreknowledge
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    One more preliminary point is in order. The dilemma of infallible foreknowledge and human free will does not rest on the particular assumption of foreknowledge and does not require an analysis of knowledge. Most contemporary accounts of knowledge are fallibilist, which means they do not require that a person believe in a way that cannot be mistaken in order to have knowledge. She has knowledge just in case what she believes is true and she satisfies the other conditions for knowledge, such as having sufficiently strong evidence. Ordinary knowledge does not require that the belief cannot be fal...

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