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    CPP is weaker than the claim that Jones' act at t2 causes... — Carmelics
    Home/Free Will & Foreknowledge
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    CPP is weaker than the claim that Jones' act at t2 causes God's belief at t1.

    Free Will & Foreknowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.CPP does not require the assumption that what Jones does at t2 causes God to have the belief he has at t1.
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    • 2.Causation does not reduce to a counterfactual dependency of an effect on its cause.
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    • 3.The dependency of God's belief on Jones' act need not be a causal dependency.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Counterfactual dependence without causation still constitutes a substantive metaphysical relation between Jones' act and God's prior belief.
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    • 2.If God's belief counterfactually depends on Jones' act, then Jones bears the same kind of modal responsibility for God's belief as he would under direct causation.
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    • 3.The distinction between causal and non-causal counterfactual dependence does not weaken the incompatibilist's core claim that Jones' act fixes the past.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Flint and Freddoso's 'Maximal Power' framework shows that any power over God's prior beliefs entails a power over the past, making CPP no less problematic than direct causation.
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    • 2.Fischer's own transfer-of-powerlessness principle applies equally to non-causal dependencies, so CPP's weakness relative to causation is dialectically irrelevant to the original incompatibilist argument.
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    Free Will & Foreknowledge

    Related

    CPP does not require the assumption that what Jones does at t2 causes God to hav...Causation does not reduce to a counterfactual dependency of an effect on its cau...Counterfactual dependence without causation still constitutes a substantive meta...Fischer's own transfer-of-powerlessness principle applies equally to non-causal ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Flint and Freddoso's 'Maximal Power' framework shows that any power over God's p...If God's belief counterfactually depends on Jones' act, then Jones bears the sam...The dependency of God's belief on Jones' act need not be a causal dependency.The distinction between causal and non-causal counterfactual dependence does not...

    Similar

    CPP does not require the assumption that what Jones does at t2 causes ...90%The dependency of God's belief on Jones' act need not be a causal depe...74%What CPP affirms instead is that there is only one actual past, but th...74%It is hard to maintain that God's belief that T is infallible (as clai...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: free-will-foreknowledge
    View source passageHide passage
    Notice that counterfactual power over the past is not the same thing as changing the past. Under the assumption that there is only one time line, changing the past is incoherent since it amounts to there being one past prior to t2 in which God has a certain belief at t1, and then Jones does something to make a different past. That requires two pasts prior to t2, and that presumably makes no sense. What (CPP) affirms instead is that there is only one actual past, but there would have been a different past if Jones acted differently at t2. (CPP) also does not require the assumption that what Jon...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit