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    It is not the case that Davidson's anomalous monism cannot move from 'mental events must instantiate non-mental strict law properties' to 'those properties must be physical' without assuming causal closure of the physical

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Davidson's framework requires mental events to instantiate non-mental, strict law properties
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    • 2.The further claim that those strict law properties must be physical requires an additional premise
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    • 3.Causal closure of the physical is not independently derived within Davidson's own explicit resources
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Davidson's own argument in 'Mental Events' moves from causal interaction to strict law instantiation without providing resources to exclude non-physical strict laws.
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    • 2.Nomological dualism—strict psychophysical or sui generis mental laws—is conceptually coherent and consistent with Davidson's three premises, as Stoutland and Sosa both argue.
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    • 3.Therefore Davidson's conclusion that the instantiated strict law properties are specifically physical requires causal closure as an unstated fourth premise.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Papineau's work establishes that causal closure is an empirical-historical thesis, not derivable from conceptual analysis of causation or lawhood alone.
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    • 2.Davidson's explicit argumentative resources consist only of the Principle of Causal Interaction, Nomological Character of Causality, and Anomalism of the Mental—none of which entail causal closure.
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    • 3.Any valid derivation of physicalism about the instantiated strict properties therefore smuggles in an empirical premise that Davidson never acknowledges or defends within his framework.
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