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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that De re modal assertions about an object are semantically equivalent to assertions about that object's counterparts in other possible worlds.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's direct reference theory establishes that proper names are rigid designators that pick out the same individual across all possible worlds.
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    • 2.If 'Aristotle' rigidly designates the same individual in every world, then de re modal claims about Aristotle concern that very individual, not numerically distinct counterparts.
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    • 3.Counterpart theory substitutes a different individual for the original object, making it a theory of de dicto similarity, not genuine de re modality about the object itself.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.The counterpart relation is vague and context-sensitive, varying with which properties are deemed salient for resemblance in a given conversational context.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If whether Humphrey could have won the election depends on which counterpart relation is operative, then de re modal truths about Humphrey lack determinate truth conditions, which Chisholm's modal essentialism explicitly rejects.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Genuine de re modality requires that modal properties belong to objects essentially and non-relatively, not relative to an arbitrarily chosen similarity metric.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.An object y in world w2 is a counterpart of object x in world w1 if y resembles x and nothing else in w2 resembles x more than y.
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    • 2.Each object is its own counterpart in the world it inhabits but typically differs in important ways from its other-worldly counterparts.
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    • 3.Sentences making de re assertions about what an object might have done or could or could not have been are unpacked semantically as sentences about that object's counterparts in other possible worlds.
      ?

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    Strongest counterpoint
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