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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Defection is not fully eliminated even when cooperation s... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Defection is not fully eliminated even when cooperation spreads to near-fixation in a spatially structured population

    ConsequentialismMoral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Single defectors on the periphery of a cooperator-dominated population can exploit cooperators at the boundary
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    • 2.These peripheral defectors survive as persistent 'criminal communities'
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Nowak & May's spatial models show defector persistence depends on lattice geometry, not a universal structural law.
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    • 2.In small-world and scale-free networks, cooperator clusters can fully envelop and starve peripheral defectors of exploitable boundaries.
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    • 3.Therefore 'near-fixation with residual defection' describes one topology, not spatially structured populations in general.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Axelrod's iterated tournament results demonstrate that reputational mechanisms, absent in purely spatial models, can drive defection to functional extinction.
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    • 2.Sober and Wilson's multilevel selection framework holds that when group-level selection pressure exceeds individual defection advantage, defection need not persist as a stable strategy.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsequentialism

    Connections

    1 topic

    Justice & Punishment1 linked

    Related

    Axelrod's iterated tournament results demonstrate that reputational mechanisms, ...In small-world and scale-free networks, cooperator clusters can fully envelop an...Nowak & May's spatial models show defector persistence depends on lattice geomet...Single defectors on the periphery of a cooperator-dominated population can explo...
    +3 moreShow less
    Sober and Wilson's multilevel selection framework holds that when group-level se...Therefore 'near-fixation with residual defection' describes one topology, not sp...These peripheral defectors survive as persistent 'criminal communities'

    Similar

    Isolated cooperators and small groups of cooperators (fewer than four)...76%Cooperation can spread and colonize originally non-altruistic populati...74%There is a threshold effect at 33% such that Fairmen's population prop...73%Single defectors on the periphery of a cooperator-dominated population...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    One of Skyrms’s models introduces correlation by means of a filter on pairing for interaction. Suppose that in round 1 of a dynamic PD individuals inspect each other and interact, or not, depending on what they find. In the second and subsequent rounds, all individuals who didn’t pair in round 1 are randomly paired. In this game, the basin of attraction for defection is large unless there is a high proportion of cooperators in round one. In this case, defectors fail to pair in round 1, then get
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit