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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    42
    Isolated cooperators and small groups of cooperators (few... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Isolated cooperators and small groups of cooperators (fewer than four) face extinction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma

    ConsequentialismMoral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Isolated cooperators have lower expected fitness than surrounding defectors
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    • 2.Groups of two cooperators each have only a 50% probability of interacting with another cooperator, leaving their average expected fitness below that of neighbouring defectors
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    • 3.Groups of three cooperators form an unstable point from which extinction and expansion are equally likely
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Nowak and May (1992) demonstrated that spatial structure itself generates cooperator clustering that violates the assumption of random neighborhood composition underlying extinction thresholds.
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    • 2.When cooperators preferentially cluster through kin selection or assortment, the 50% interaction probability premise dissolves, as Hamilton's inclusive fitness framework predicts stable cooperation below the four-agent threshold.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The 'unstable equilibrium' characterization of three-cooperator groups assumes a static spatial lattice, but Axelrod's iterated tournament results show that small cooperative clusters stabilize through reciprocal interaction history rather than instantaneous fitness comparisons.
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    • 2.Treating extinction probability as equivalent to expansion probability at the three-agent threshold conflates single-round payoff structure with iterated game dynamics, a category error Skyrms explicitly warns against in 'Evolution of the Social Contract'.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsequentialism

    Connections

    2 topics

    Social Contract3 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    Groups of three cooperators form an unstable point from which extinction and exp...Groups of two cooperators each have only a 50% probability of interacting with a...Isolated cooperators have lower expected fitness than surrounding defectorsNowak and May (1992) demonstrated that spatial structure itself generates cooper...
    +3 moreShow less
    The 'unstable equilibrium' characterization of three-cooperator groups assumes a...Treating extinction probability as equivalent to expansion probability at the th...

    Similar

    A cooperative equilibrium exists in finitely repeated prisoner's dilem...77%Defection is not fully eliminated even when cooperation spreads to nea...76%Single defectors on the periphery of a cooperator-dominated population...74%When cooperators form sufficiently large groups, cooperators as a grou...73%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    One of Skyrms’s models introduces correlation by means of a filter on pairing for interaction. Suppose that in round 1 of a dynamic PD individuals inspect each other and interact, or not, depending on what they find. In the second and subsequent rounds, all individuals who didn’t pair in round 1 are randomly paired. In this game, the basin of attraction for defection is large unless there is a high proportion of cooperators in round one. In this case, defectors fail to pair in round 1, then get
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    When cooperators preferentially cluster through kin selection or assortment, the...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit