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    This predisposition and its conditions, if understood cor... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→Dualism is a psychological tendency, not a philosophically defensible position.

    This predisposition and its conditions, if understood correctly, reveal that the distinction does not reflect genuine metaphysical separateness.

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
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    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

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    Dualism is a psychological tendency, not a philosophically defensible position.Finite minds have a natural predisposition to distinguish what is 'outside us' f...The apparent duality of nature and mind collapses once the conditions of our per...

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    Fichte’s dynamic conception of idealism was adopted almost immediately by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), who in the first period of his philosophical career became next to Fichte the most outspoken defender of this hybrid variety of idealism. In doing so he transformed Fichte’s I-centered approach to reality via an analysis of the conditions of knowledge/cognition and agency into an idealistic version of a monistic ontology. In this he was followed by Hegel. Whereas Fichte had m

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