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    Essential property instances of God are not more dependen... — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Essential property instances of God are not more dependent on God than God is on them.

    Divine Attributes
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.All of God's properties are essential: God is essentially omniscient, omnipotent, etc.
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    • 2.Should either God or the omniscience of God cease to be, the other would also cease to be.
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    • 3.The dependence objection holds for accidental property instances but not for essential property instances (e.g., Socrates may lose his wisdom but cannot lose his humanity).
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mutual existential dependence between two entities does not entail ontological equality between them.
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    • 2.God's essential properties depend on God for their instantiation, but God's existence does not depend on any property instance for its ground.
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    • 3.Asymmetric ontological priority can obtain even when co-destruction follows necessarily, as Aristotle's substance-accident relation demonstrates.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kit Fine's distinction between generic and consequential essence shows that mutual entailment does not collapse into mutual essence-dependence.
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    • 2.Even if God cannot exist without omniscience, it does not follow that omniscience is not ontologically posterior to God in the order of real definition.
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    Divine Attributes

    Related

    All of God's properties are essential: God is essentially omniscient, omnipotent...Asymmetric ontological priority can obtain even when co-destruction follows nece...Even if God cannot exist without omniscience, it does not follow that omniscienc...God's essential properties depend on God for their instantiation, but God's exis...
    +4 moreShow less
    Kit Fine's distinction between generic and consequential essence shows that mutu...Mutual existential dependence between two entities does not entail ontological e...Should either God or the omniscience of God cease to be, the other would also ce...The dependence objection holds for accidental property instances but not for ess...

    Similar

    Socrates instantiates a rich property, and so is an instance of a prop...83%The dependence objection holds for accidental property instances but n...82%But everything instantiating properties (being an instance of properti...77%No person is a property instance—not God, not me, not Socrates.76%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: divine-simplicity
    View source passageHide passage
    If you object that persons are substances and thus independent items while property instances are not substances but dependent on substances, Mann’s response will be that the point holds for accidental property instances but not for essential property instances. Socrates may lose his wisdom but he cannot lose his humanity. Now all of God’s properties are essential: God is essentially omniscient, omnipotent, etc. So it seems to Mann that “the omniscience of God is not any more dependent on God than God is on the omniscience of God: should either cease to be, the other would also.” (2015, 37) Th...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit