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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    42
    Even a very specific prophecy that renders an action inev... — Carmelics
    Home/Free Will & Foreknowledge
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Even a very specific prophecy that renders an action inevitable does not thereby make that action unfree.

    Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Rendering an action inevitable is not the same as making the action unfree.
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    • 2.Freedom of action is distinct from freedom of will.
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    • 3.An action can be inevitable and yet still be a free action.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.If a specific prophecy guarantees an action will occur, then no alternative possibilities exist for the agent at the moment of action.
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    • 2.Genuine freedom of will requires the ability to do otherwise under identical circumstances, as defended by libertarians from Reid to van Inwagen.
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    • 3.An action that admits of no alternative possibilities cannot be free in the morally relevant sense, even if performed without external compulsion.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.The distinction between freedom of action and freedom of will collapses when the will itself is the object rendered inevitable by the prophecy.
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    • 2.Frankfurt-style compatibilism notwithstanding, if a prophesied agent's deliberative process is pre-determined by foreknowledge, the will's authenticity is undermined, as Kant argued in the Critique of Pure Reason regarding causal necessity and rational autonomy.
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    Topics

    Free Will & Foreknowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Moral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    An action can be inevitable and yet still be a free action.An action that admits of no alternative possibilities cannot be free in the mora...Frankfurt-style compatibilism notwithstanding, if a prophesied agent's deliberat...Freedom of action is distinct from freedom of will.
    +4 moreShow less
    Genuine freedom of will requires the ability to do otherwise under identical cir...If a specific prophecy guarantees an action will occur, then no alternative poss...Rendering an action inevitable is not the same as making the action unfree.The distinction between freedom of action and freedom of will collapses when the...

    Similar

    Most prophecies do not render the prophesied actions unfree because mo...86%Rendering an action inevitable is not the same as making the action un...85%An action can be inevitable and yet still be a free action.79%A true prophecy about the contingent future could have been false, eve...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: prophecy
    View source passageHide passage
    Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, probably the most prominent advocates of the atemporal eternity view, have defended the atemporal eternity approach to prophecy against Widerker’s objection (see Stump and Kretzmann 1991). They point out that most prophecies are conditional or vague, so that they leave “room” for different ways in which they might be fulfilled (400–401). If a prophecy were to be very specific, then it might actually render the action in question inevitable, they admit, but th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit