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    Rendering an action inevitable is not the same as making ... — Carmelics
    Home/Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    Supports→Even a very specific prophecy that renders an action inevitable does not thereby make that action unfree.

    Rendering an action inevitable is not the same as making the action unfree.

    Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    Free Will & Foreknowledge

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    An action can be inevitable and yet still be a free action.

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    SEP: prophecy
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    Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, probably the most prominent advocates of the atemporal eternity view, have defended the atemporal eternity approach to prophecy against Widerker’s objection (see Stump and Kretzmann 1991). They point out that most prophecies are conditional or vague, so that they leave “room” for different ways in which they might be fulfilled (400–401). If a prophecy were to be very specific, then it might actually render the action in question inevitable, they admit, but th

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