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    It is not the case that Even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Nagel's model, we should not speak of proper reduction if the connection between the domains of the two theories remains too loose to support materialist claims.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Bridge laws in Nagel's model need not assert identity; they may express nomological coextension, which is sufficient for inter-theoretic reduction without full materialist commitment.
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    • 2.Requiring reduction to 'support materialist claims' conflates the epistemic project of theory unification with the metaphysical project of ontological elimination, which Nagel's model never intended to serve.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kemeny and Oppenheim's purely syntactic model of reduction achieves explanatory absorption of one theory by another without any appeal to inter-domain ontological tightness.
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    • 2.If reduction can be formally complete under Kemeny-Oppenheim without satisfying materialist constraints, then materialist adequacy is not a necessary condition on legitimate reduction.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Nagel's model of reduction requires a specific kind of bridge relation between two theories.
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    • 2.A connection between theoretical domains that is too loose, as a matter of epistemic possibility, fails to support the materialist claims reduction is meant to establish.
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