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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Everything owes its existence directly or indirectly to God — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Everything owes its existence directly or indirectly to God

    Divine AttributesNatural Theology
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Everything is either one or many
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    • 2.Any many is a collection of ones
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    • 3.Any one depends on a pure one
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Spinoza's substance monism demonstrates that a self-caused infinite substance can ground existence without functioning as a transcendent creator in any theistically meaningful sense.
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    • 2.If God's causal relationship to creation is necessary rather than free, then 'owing existence to God' becomes a logical or structural dependency, not a theologically robust creation ex nihilo.
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    • 3.A necessary emanation relation, as in Plotinus, undermines the asymmetric dependence the claim requires, since the One itself is constituted partly through its relation to what proceeds from it.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Necessary existence can be instantiated by multiple independent beings, as Avicenna's own modal framework does not logically exclude co-necessary existents.
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    • 2.Al-Farabi's inference from 'pure unity' to numerical singularity conflates conceptual purity with ontological uniqueness, a fallacy Scotus later identified in similar arguments.
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    Topics

    Divine AttributesNatural Theology

    Connections

    2 topics

    Proof of definition segments2 linkedModality & Possibility2 linked

    Related

    A necessary emanation relation, as in Plotinus, undermines the asymmetric depend...Al-Farabi's inference from 'pure unity' to numerical singularity conflates conce...Any many is a collection of onesAny one depends on a pure one
    +5 moreShow less
    Everything is either one or manyGod is the only pure oneIf God's causal relationship to creation is necessary rather than free, then 'ow...Necessary existence can be instantiated by multiple independent beings, as Avice...

    Similar

    Anything other than the First must derive its being directly or indire...80%Therefore, it is necessary that God exists.78%All things other than the First derive their being from the First dire...78%Whatever exists must have a cause or ground for its existence78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: al-farabi-metaphysics
    View source passageHide passage
    Main themes of the treatise include distinguishing a whole family of senses of “one” (in a few cases Fârâbî also gives the corresponding senses of the abstract “unity”), but also and especially distinguishing different ways that senses of “one” are related to senses of “many”. The treatise can read like a dry catalogue, and Fârâbî rarely gives arguments or admits that his claims might be controversial, but it is often clear that he has an opponent in mind. That opponent might be a type rather th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Spinoza's substance monism demonstrates that a self-caused infinite substance ca...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit