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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Extensional counterexamples involving unusual desires (eating mud, counting grass, turning on radios) do not refute internalism about practical reasons

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Internalism's necessary condition claim entails that agents with radically deviant desires (e.g., counting grass) can have reasons others lack, which is itself a counterintuitive result.
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    • 2.If internalism cannot explain why bizarre desires fail to generate genuine reasons, it loses explanatory priority over externalist accounts that simply deny such reasons exist.
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    • 3.Williams himself acknowledged that sound deliberative procedures should filter out certain desires, implying internalism requires normative constraints that undermine its purely motivational basis.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.The necessary/sufficient condition distinction only defuses the counterexamples if internalism can specify which desires ground reasons without appealing to external normative facts.
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    • 2.Any principled restriction on desire-based reasons (e.g., requiring full information or rational reflection) smuggles in objective normative standards that externalists like Parfit and Scanlon explicitly endorse.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.These counterexamples target views that postulate a sufficient condition for the existence of reasons
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    • 2.Internalism postulates only necessary conditions for the existence of reasons, not sufficient conditions
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    • 3.An objection to a sufficient condition claim does not apply to a necessary condition claim
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