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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Extensional Mereology's principle that identity follows from sameness of parts (principle P.5 and its consequence principle 27) is too strong and imposes an incorrect constraint on the parthood relation.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Principle (27) follows from principle (P.5) of Extensional Mereology.
      ?

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    • 2.Sameness of proper parts is not sufficient for identity (established by the argument from word/tune/arrangement/group/cat-tissue cases).
      ?

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    • 3.Sameness of proper parts is not necessary for identity (established by the argument from mereological change survival).
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Coincident entities like Lumpl and Goliath share all the same parts yet are numerically distinct objects with different modal properties.
      ?

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    • 2.If distinct objects can share all parts, then part-identity (P.5) fails as a general metaphysical principle governing the parthood relation.
      ?

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    • 3.Kit Fine's and Kathleen Koslicki's hylomorphic frameworks demonstrate that constitution without identity is coherent and well-grounded in the literature.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Four-dimensionalist perdurance theory requires temporal stages, making the same persisting object composable from different part-slices at different times.
      ?

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    • 2.If a persisting object can survive mereological change across time, then sameness of parts across temporal stages cannot be necessary for identity, refuting P.5's universality.
      ?

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    • 3.David Lewis's and Theodore Sider's stage-theoretic accounts explicitly commit to objects having non-identical part-sets at different times while remaining self-identical.
      ?

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