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    External sense objects are real — Carmelics
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    321,452
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    Home/Perception
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    External sense objects are real

    PerceptionTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If external sense objects were nonexistent, there would be no intentional objects for cognition
      ?

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    • 2.If there are no intentional objects, cognition would not arise
      ?

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    • 3.Cognitions do in fact arise
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Cognition can arise from internal mental representations (vijñaptis) without any external object causing them, as Vasubandhu argues in the Viṃśatikā.
      ?

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    • 2.The dream argument demonstrates that phenomenologically indistinguishable cognitions occur without corresponding external objects.
      ?

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    • 3.If cognition is self-luminous and self-certifying, its arising requires no external cause beyond prior karmic seeds in the ālayavijñāna.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dignāga's apoha theory shows that perception of 'external' objects is always already conceptually constructed through exclusion (anyāpoha), not direct realist contact.
      ?

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    • 2.What appears as an external object is the form (ākāra) projected by consciousness itself, making the 'external' posit epistemically redundant under Occam's razor.
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    Topics

    PerceptionTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind3 linked

    Related

    Cognition can arise from internal mental representations (vijñaptis) without any...Cognitions do in fact ariseDignāga's apoha theory shows that perception of 'external' objects is always alr...If cognition is self-luminous and self-certifying, its arising requires no exter...
    +4 moreShow less
    If external sense objects were nonexistent, there would be no intentional object...If there are no intentional objects, cognition would not ariseThe dream argument demonstrates that phenomenologically indistinguishable cognit...What appears as an external object is the form (ākāra) projected by consciousnes...

    Similar

    External sense-objects are unreal.89%Descriptions are real, existing objects84%Such objects are not real in the same sense for noble beings82%For Hegel, 'real' is not restricted to indicating the presence of some...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: twotruths-india
    View source passageHide passage
    The realist insists that the external sense objects are real and that their reality is ascertained by the various means of knowledge (pramāṇas) of which perception (pratyakṣa) is the most important. If the external sense objects are nonexistents, there can be no intentional objects, then cognition would not arise. Since cognitions do arise, there must be external objects as their intentional objects.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit