Frankfurt-style cases show that an agent can be manipulated into having the very second-order volitions they endorse, undermining the self-authorship condition compatibilists like Frankfurt require for freedom.
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Thought experiments designed to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action even when the agent lacks the ability to do otherwise, typically involving a counterfactual intervener (like Black) who would ensure a particular outcome if the agent showed any inclination otherwise.
Self-authorship(as used in theories of freedom and responsibility)
The idea that you are truly in control of your own choices and decisions, rather than being controlled by outside forces.
second-order volitions(Augustine's distinction between orders of volition)
Acts of the liberum voluntatis arbitrium by which one chooses between conflicting first-order volitions