Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Fregean propositions are more fine-grained than Russellia... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Fregean propositions are more fine-grained than Russellian propositions

    Philosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Senses are objective, in that more than one person can express thoughts with a given sense
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Senses correspond many-one to objects (multiple senses can pick out the same object)
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Russellian propositions correspond many-one to intensions (multiple Russellian propositions can share the same intension)
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Senses are individuated by cognitive significance, yet there is no principled criterion that prevents infinite regress in sense-individuation (as Dummett acknowledges).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Without a stable individuation criterion, 'more fine-grained' loses determinate meaning, since Fregean propositions may be indeterminate in number rather than merely more numerous.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Direct reference theorists (Kaplan, Kripke) hold that names and indexicals contribute objects, not descriptive senses, to propositional content.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If names lack Fregean senses, co-referring names like 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' yield identical Fregean and Russellian propositions, collapsing the alleged fine-grainedness asymmetry.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Philosophy of Language

    Connections

    1 topic

    Truth & Knowledge1 linked

    Related

    Direct reference theorists (Kaplan, Kripke) hold that names and indexicals contr...Fregean propositions correspond many-one to Russellian propositions (multiple Fr...If names lack Fregean senses, co-referring names like 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus...Russellian propositions correspond many-one to intensions (multiple Russellian p...
    +4 moreShow less
    Senses are individuated by cognitive significance, yet there is no principled cr...Senses are objective, in that more than one person can express thoughts with a g...Senses correspond many-one to objects (multiple senses can pick out the same obj...Without a stable individuation criterion, 'more fine-grained' loses determinate ...

    Similar

    Platonism about propositions is not clearly more problematic than Plat...81%A sentence can express a trivial or literal proposition while the spea...81%Conceptualism about propositions is ruled out80%If propositions are the objects of belief, then sentences ascribing di...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: meaning
    View source passageHide passage
    Senses are then objective, in that more than one person can express thoughts with a given sense, and correspond many-one to objects. Thus, just as Russellian propositions correspond many-one to intensions, Fregean propositions correspond many-one to Russellian propositions. This is sometimes expressed by the claim that Fregean contents are more fine-grained than Russellian contents (or intensions).
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit