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    Genuine willing requires determinate cognition of the obj... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Genuine willing requires determinate cognition of the object and conviction that the object is attainable

    Consciousness & MindFree Will & Foreknowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Desire becomes will only when the object is determinately cognized and fixed
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    • 2.One cannot will what one believes to be unattainable — for example, leaping tall buildings is desirable but not willable
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Frankfurt's cases of willing under uncertainty demonstrate agents genuinely will outcomes they assign non-trivial probability of failure.
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    • 2.A mountaineer who wills to summit Everest knowing death is likely satisfies no 'attainability conviction' yet exhibits paradigmatic willing.
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    • 3.The Herbartian criterion conflates the psychological structure of willing with the epistemic conditions of deliberation, collapsing two distinct phenomena.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Sartre's analysis shows willing can precede and constitute its object rather than require a pre-given determinate cognition of it.
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    • 2.In radical choice, the agent wills under ontological indeterminacy, creating the object's meaning through the act of choosing itself.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & MindFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Related

    A mountaineer who wills to summit Everest knowing death is likely satisfies no '...Desire becomes will only when the object is determinately cognized and fixedFrankfurt's cases of willing under uncertainty demonstrate agents genuinely will...In radical choice, the agent wills under ontological indeterminacy, creating the...
    +3 moreShow less
    One cannot will what one believes to be unattainable — for example, leaping tall...Sartre's analysis shows willing can precede and constitute its object rather tha...The Herbartian criterion conflates the psychological structure of willing with t...

    Similar

    For anything to count as human willing, it must be based on a maxim to...79%Anything that counts as human willing is subject to rational requireme...77%If willing is constrained by the moral law, it is difficult to account...76%What cannot be grasped in a determinate concept stimulates free play a...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: johann-herbart
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    Practical judgment judges the “will”, a species of desire marked by determinate cognition and fixing of its object, and by conviction that the object is attainable. While I might desire to leap tall buildings in a bound, I cannot will it (SW II: 99). Now the value of the will’s object cannot determine its evaluation, since Herbart like Kant excludes all material grounds as determinative of moral action. Hence the will itself is the object of evaluation—but how? Because every instance of willing
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit