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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Giles of Rome's account of the ontological status of intelligible species is internally inconsistent

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Giles' causal interpretation implies the species belongs to the same kind as the represented thing
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    • 2.Giles also holds that the species inheres in the intellect as an accident in a substance
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    • 3.Giles himself claims the species are neither substances nor accidents, yet can be 'reduced' to the kind of the represented thing
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Giles treats intelligible species as both formal likenesses and efficient causal vehicles, assigning them simultaneously to two incompatible ontological registers.
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    • 2.Aristotelian hylomorphism permits no middle category between substance and accident, so any entity claimed to transcend this division generates a genuine contradiction within that framework.
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    • 3.Giles explicitly invokes the Aristotelian categories as the exhaustive ontological grid while simultaneously claiming species escape them, violating the principle of non-contradiction on his own terms.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aquinas resolves the analogous tension by strictly subordinating species to the esse intentionale/esse naturale distinction, a move Giles partially adopts but then undermines by also attributing real accidental inherence to the same species.
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    • 2.If a single entity possesses both intentional being (which is not accidental inherence) and real accidental being (which is), then Giles' account assigns contradictory modes of existence to the same item without a principled criterion for adjudication.
      ?

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