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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Goodness is a non-natural property

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The open question argument proves too much: identity statements like 'water is H2O' were once conceptually open yet water is identical to H2O.
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    • 2.Conceptual openness tracks epistemic gaps between descriptions, not ontological non-identity between properties.
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    • 3.Therefore, the open question argument fails to establish that goodness is non-natural, only that 'good' and natural predicates differ in sense.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Cornell realists like Boyd and Sturgeon argue 'good' refers to a cluster of natural properties that causally regulate human flourishing, fixed by causal-historical reference rather than analytic definition.
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    • 2.If reference is fixed causally rather than analytically, the absence of a correct naturalistic definition of 'good' is compatible with goodness being a natural property.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.For any proposed naturalistic analysis N of the moral predicate 'good', a conceptually competent judge can grant that something is N while still coherently wondering whether it is really good
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    • 2.If N were an accurate analysis of 'good', then the question 'I know it is N but is it good?' would not be conceptually open for a competent judge
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    • 3.The question of whether goodness is co-instantiated with any natural property or set of natural properties is always conceptually open
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.No naturalistic definition of 'good' is correct
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    • 2.If 'good' cannot be defined in natural terms, the property of goodness must be non-natural
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    Next step

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.