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    Goodness is a non-natural property — Carmelics
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    Goodness is a non-natural property

    Philosophy of LanguageVirtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.For any proposed naturalistic analysis N of the moral predicate 'good', a conceptually competent judge can grant that something is N while still coherently wondering whether it is really good
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    • 2.If N were an accurate analysis of 'good', then the question 'I know it is N but is it good?' would not be conceptually open for a competent judge
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    • 3.The question of whether goodness is co-instantiated with any natural property or set of natural properties is always conceptually open
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.No naturalistic definition of 'good' is correct
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    • 2.If 'good' cannot be defined in natural terms, the property of goodness must be non-natural
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.The open question argument proves too much: identity statements like 'water is H2O' were once conceptually open yet water is identical to H2O.
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    • 2.Conceptual openness tracks epistemic gaps between descriptions, not ontological non-identity between properties.
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    • 3.Therefore, the open question argument fails to establish that goodness is non-natural, only that 'good' and natural predicates differ in sense.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Cornell realists like Boyd and Sturgeon argue 'good' refers to a cluster of natural properties that causally regulate human flourishing, fixed by causal-historical reference rather than analytic definition.
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    • 2.If reference is fixed causally rather than analytically, the absence of a correct naturalistic definition of 'good' is compatible with goodness being a natural property.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageVirtue Ethics

    Connections

    1 topic

    Truth & Knowledge3 linked

    Related

    Conceptual openness tracks epistemic gaps between descriptions, not ontological ...Cornell realists like Boyd and Sturgeon argue 'good' refers to a cluster of natu...For any proposed naturalistic analysis N of the moral predicate 'good', a concep...If 'good' cannot be defined in natural terms, the property of goodness must be n...
    +6 moreShow less
    If N were an accurate analysis of 'good', then the question 'I know it is N but ...If reference is fixed causally rather than analytically, the absence of a correc...No naturalistic definition of 'good' is correctThe open question argument proves too much: identity statements like 'water is H...The question of whether goodness is co-instantiated with any natural property or...Therefore, the open question argument fails to establish that goodness is non-na...

    Similar

    Moral properties are not natural properties93%Moral properties cannot be natural properties90%There is no non-natural property of goodness88%Natural properties are not normative.80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-epistemology-a-priori
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    According Moore, all naturalistic analytic definitions of “good” fail, committing what he called “the naturalistic fallacy”. To show all naturalistic analyses of goodness fail, Moore presented the “open-question argument”. The basic idea is that if a definition of “good” is correct, a morally competent person could not sensibly question whether something satisfying the definition is good. Consider a definable term: a triangle is a closed plane figure with three angles. No person who understands
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    4 (2 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit